When the Jamaica Debt Exchange closed at the end of January 2010, the government had expected broad participation. What it got was something closer to a national act of faith. Ninety-nine point two percent of eligible domestic bondholders had voluntarily surrendered their existing securities for new bonds with lower interest rates and longer maturities — a participation rate that would be cited internationally as one of the most successful debt exchanges in the developing world. The IMF Board’s formal approval followed twelve days later. Jamaica had, against considerable odds, bought itself a chance.

In the fourth quarter of 2009, Jamaica needed three things simultaneously: a new Bank of Jamaica governor, a deal with the IMF, and some evidence that the economy might eventually stop contracting. It got all three. The governor arrived in December, the IMF agreement was initialled days later, and the GDP figures, when finally tabulated, confirmed that 2009 had produced a 3.4 percent contraction — the worst in a generation. Whether the deal would deliver recovery was another question entirely.

Jamaica crosses into 2010 with its housing deficit intact, mortgage rates above 13%, and the nation bracing for a major fiscal reckoning with the IMF.