SURFSIDE, Florida. On the last full day it stood, water was coming through the garage ceiling at 8777 Collins Avenue. Federal investigators later noted that the leak was in an area that had been the site of many cracks and repairs over the years, and that the flow increased sharply in the hours before the building fell. Upstairs, in a 12 storey tower of 136 apartments completed in 1981, most residents were asleep.

At about 1:14 a.m. on 24 June 2021, part of the pool deck beside Champlain Towers South gave way. At about 1:22 a.m. the middle and eastern sections of the tower came down in less than 12 seconds. Ninety eight people died. Roof repairs were under way. The concrete repairs that engineers had called for nearly three years earlier had not begun, and the owners’ payments towards them were due in a week.
Five years on, the investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has set out how a building can fail slowly for decades and then all at once. It is a Florida story, but it is also a story about every apartment block whose owners share a roof, a slab and a repair bill. That includes the towers rising across New Kingston and the more than 2,000 strata schemes across the island, many of them decades old, where the law asks owners to insure and repair their buildings but not to inspect their structure or save for its old age.
A Tower That Was Thin From the Start
The NIST team, led by Judith Mitrani-Reiser with Glenn Bell as co-lead, did not find a single blow that brought the building down. It found a structure with little room for error from the day it opened. An independent check of the original design found widespread shortfalls in bending and in the strength of the joints where floor slabs meet columns, measured against both the codes of the time and today’s. In some places the design provided less than half the strength the code required.
Construction then took more of that margin away. The drawings placed the top layer of reinforcing steel in the pool deck about three quarters of an inch below the surface; investigators found it sitting about two inches down, where it does less work. The drawings required at least a quarter of the top bars in the strip around each column to pass over the column itself; investigators typically found fewer than that. Bars near the columns were spaced roughly 20 to 40 per cent wider than specified. NIST found no records showing whether these changes were approved or seen by inspectors.
Over the next four decades the deck carried more than it was designed for. Large planters, heavier and more extensive than the drawings showed, held palm trees for much of the building’s life. About 15 years after completion, a renovation replaced most of the original tile with a membrane, pavers and a sand bed, adding weight to a slab that was already short of strength. Salt laden water did the rest. Corrosion was heaviest under the planters and wherever salty water collected, and it was visible more than 25 years before the collapse.
In June 2026 Judith Mitrani-Reiser described the tower plainly: “Champlain Towers South was, therefore, a very vulnerable building from its earliest days.”
Miami Had Learned This Lesson Once Before
South Florida already had a rule built for buildings like this one, and it too was written after a collapse. On 5 August 1974 a federal Drug Enforcement Administration office in Miami fell in on itself, killing seven employees. Investigators found that poor construction materials had contributed. A young county engineer, John Pistorino, concluded that salt had corroded the steel, and drew the lesson that concrete and steel in a salty climate age in a predictable way. “When the reinforcing steel corrodes, it expands and cracks the concrete,” he later explained.
The result was Miami Dade County’s 40 year recertification: once a building turns 40, a licensed engineer or architect must inspect it and certify it safe to occupy, and then do so again every ten years. Much of the rest of Florida had no such rule.
Champlain Towers South was approaching that birthday. In June 2020 the association hired the engineer Frank Morabito’s firm to begin the recertification. The weakness of a calendar rule is that it is triggered by age, not by evidence, and the decay at Surfside had been visible for decades.
The Report That Used the Word Exponentially
Mr Morabito’s firm had in fact looked at the building earlier. Its report of October 2018 found that the waterproofing under the pool deck had been laid flat rather than sloped, so rain had nowhere to drain. It recorded “abundant cracking and spalling” in the garage, and noted that where earlier cracks had been injected with epoxy, new cracks were spreading out from the old ones.
Its central finding was blunt: “The failed waterproofing is causing major structural damage to the concrete structural slab below these areas.”
The report warned that failing to replace the waterproofing soon would cause the concrete deterioration to “expand exponentially”. It put the cost of the major repairs at about US$9.1 million.
What the report did not do was order anyone to act. In Florida, as in Jamaica, an association’s engineer advises and the owners, through their board, decide when to spend.
Fifteen Million Dollars, Due on the First of July
By the spring of 2021 the price had risen. On 9 April the board president, Jean Wodnicki, wrote to owners that conditions had worsened since 2018. “The concrete deterioration is accelerating,” she told them, and the roof had also deteriorated, so extensive roof work had been added to the programme. The board levied a special assessment of about US$15 million, covering the concrete work, the added roof work and other items, against the US$9.1 million estimated for the structural repairs in 2018. Owners faced bills ranging from about US$80,000 for a one bedroom apartment to more than US$300,000 for a penthouse, with payments due from 1 July 2021.
The roofing work was under way. The concrete restoration, the work that addressed the slab, had not started. In the weeks that followed, the warning signs that NIST later catalogued gathered in one corner of the property: a sliding glass door that came off its frame, a horizontal crack in a planter wall, a gate that shifted and jammed. All of them were concentrated in the small area of the pool deck and parking deck where, investigators later concluded, the structure was already failing.
Three Weeks of Failure, Then Twelve Seconds
NIST’s technical findings, presented in June 2026, place the start of the collapse not on 24 June but about three weeks earlier. In early June, the team concluded, one of the joints where the pool deck slab sat on a column most likely failed by punching shear: the column pushed up through the concrete around it. A second joint probably failed in mid June. Load shifted to neighbouring columns, which failed in turn, and the deck sagged and pulled away from the southern wall.
In the early hours of 24 June the deck pulled away from the middle of the tower and damaged two critical joints there. The middle of the tower collapsed progressively to the north; the eastern section swayed, its lower columns failed, and it fell. The western section was left standing until it was demolished on 4 July. The team said small variations on this sequence are also consistent with the evidence, and ruled out vibration from pile driving at the 87 Park tower next door, sinkholes, hurricanes and the roofing work.
No one in the U.S. should ever have to go to bed wondering if their building will collapse during the night.
Judith Mitrani-Reiser, NIST lead investigator, technical findings, June 2026
The money that was not spent on repairs was dwarfed by what followed. On 23 June 2022, a day before the first anniversary, Judge Michael Hanzman of the Miami Dade circuit court approved a settlement of about US$1.02 billion for the victims and their families. About half of it came from Securitas, the security company that monitored the building’s safety systems. The empty lot was sold to the Dubai developer Damac, the only bidder, for US$120 million.
The US$15 million that 136 households had been asked to find was a fraction of what the failure cost. The cost of deferral is real; it simply arrives later, and all at once.
Florida Rewrote the Rules. Others Had Long Before
Florida’s legislature moved quickly. In a special session in May 2022 it passed SB 4-D without a single vote against it: 38 to 0 in the Senate and 110 to 0 in the House. Every condominium and cooperative building of three habitable storeys or more must now have a milestone inspection at 30 years and every ten years after; the original law set 25 years for buildings within three miles of the coast, a requirement a 2023 amendment left to local choice. Buildings certified for occupancy by 1 July 1992 had to finish their first inspection by the end of 2024. Associations must also commission a structural integrity reserve study every ten years and save for the repairs it identifies.
The scale of what that meant became clear quickly. In 2022 Florida had about 1.53 million condominium units in 27,563 associations, according to state data compiled by the University of Florida. Some 912,000 of those units, close to 60 per cent, were in buildings at least 30 years old. In Miami Dade, Broward and Palm Beach, 74 per cent of condominiums had been built in or before 1993.
Owners found themselves paying for decades of underfunding in a few years. A 2024 analysis by the University of Florida’s Warrington College of Business described rising monthly fees, special assessments of tens of thousands of dollars, and owners who borrowed or were forced to sell. Prices also eased: Florida Realtors reported that the statewide median price of a condominium or townhouse fell 4.7 per cent in 2025, to US$305,000.
In 2025 the legislature eased the pressure with HB 913. It pushed the deadline for reserve studies to the end of 2025, let associations fund reserves with loans or lines of credit if a majority of owners agree, allowed a temporary pause in reserve contributions after a milestone inspection, and exempted some small buildings.
Other places had learned the same lesson from their own disasters. On 15 March 1986 the Hotel New World in Singapore collapsed, killing 33 people; the cause was structural faults in the design and construction, compounded by neglected defects. Singapore passed its Building Control Act on 16 February 1989, required independent checking of structural designs, and introduced periodic structural inspections. Today residential buildings there must be inspected by a structural engineer once every ten years and other buildings every five. Its strata law also divides owners’ contributions into a management fund for running costs and a sinking fund for long term work such as repainting and replacing major equipment.
Hong Kong, a city of ageing high rises, made its Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme fully operative on 30 June 2012. Private buildings aged 30 years or more can be served with notices requiring owners to appoint a registered inspector and carry out repairs to common parts, external walls and projections. About 15,000 buildings were eligible when it began, and the Buildings Department selects about 2,000 a year.
| Place | Which buildings | Structural inspection | Saving for repairs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Florida (statewide, since 2022) | Condominiums of 3 habitable storeys or more | At 30 years, then every 10 | Yes, reserve study every 10 years |
| Miami Dade County (since the 1970s) | Larger buildings, not houses | At 40 years, then every 10 | No |
| Singapore | All but landed houses and temporary buildings | Every 10 years (homes), every 5 (others) | Sinking fund within strata law |
| Hong Kong (since 2012) | Private buildings 30 years or older | When selected by the Buildings Department | No statutory reserve study |
| Jamaica | No structural inspection rule for existing buildings | None | No; a fund for administrative expenses is optional |
What Kingston’s Towers Are Not Asked to Do
Jamaica’s apartment buildings are governed by the Registration (Strata Titles) Act, which dates from the late 1960s. It requires each strata corporation to insure the building to its replacement value and to keep the common property “in a state of good and serviceable repair”. It allows, but does not require, a fund for administrative expenses. It says nothing about a reserve or sinking fund by name, and nothing about periodic structural inspection or a study of how long the roof, the slabs and the columns will last.
Amendments that took effect on 1 January 2010 created the Commission of Strata Corporations, administered by the Real Estate Board, to register and supervise the corporations. By 17 November 2021 there were 2,006 incorporated strata plans, of which 1,710, about 85 per cent, were registered, according to figures the Board gave at the time. The Commission’s random inspections check whether annual meetings were held, whether there is proof of insurance, who sits on the executive committee and whether common areas breach the strata plan or bylaws. They are not engineering surveys.
The law is far firmer about money owed than about concrete. A corporation whose owner is more than 30 days behind can, with a certificate from the Commission, sell that owner’s unit, and unpaid contributions rank ahead of the mortgage. Collecting the monthly fee is well provided for. Raising a large sum for a structural repair that a minority of owners resist is not.
The Building Act, in force since 15 January 2019, gives municipal corporations power to order owners to repair buildings certified as dangerous and to issue emergency orders. Those powers react to danger once it is identified. In December 2025 the Mayor of Montego Bay, Richard Vernon, wrote that in many parishes fewer than a dozen inspectors are responsible for thousands of construction sites.
The hazard is not hypothetical. Kingston was rebuilt after the earthquake of 1907. In 2010 Dr Lyndon Brown, then head of the Earthquake Unit at the University of the West Indies, Mona, said Kingston was probably in one of the worst locations on the island and at greatest risk of soil liquefaction.
There is a fair argument against copying Florida wholesale. Inspections and reserve studies cost money, and Jamaican strata owners already pay fees to the Commission; in June 2026 one owner, Paul Ward, wrote to The Gleaner that his six apartment complex had paid more than J$600,000 since 2010 and received little in return. A rule that forced sudden assessments could push pensioners and first time buyers out of their homes, as it has in parts of Florida. The counter argument is the one Surfside makes: the cost of an inspection is known and modest, and the cost of not knowing is unbounded. One option, along the lines of Singapore’s, is a phased rule tied to building height and age, paired with a sinking fund built from monthly fees, which would spread the bill across decades rather than leave it to one unlucky generation of owners.
The Lot on Collins Avenue
The land at 8777 Collins Avenue was sold in 2022 to the developer Damac. The planters and their palms are gone, and so is the pool deck that carried them. What remains is a record: drawings from 1979 that asked too little of the concrete, a repair in the 1990s that treated the leaks, a report in 2018 that named the danger, a letter in April 2021 that priced it, and a bill that fell due one week too late.
The engineers have explained how the building failed; their final report, with recommendations for codes and practice, is still being written. The question the building leaves for every city of apartment towers, Kingston among them, is simpler than any finding in the NIST reports. It is whether anyone is required to look under the pool deck before the water starts coming through the ceiling.

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