Jamaica Economic Intelligence | Q1 2023 | January–March 2023
Key Findings
- Silicon Valley Bank collapses on March 10 in the second-largest US bank failure in history, followed within days by the closure of Signature Bank and the emergency takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS; the banking stress episode tests the financial stability implications of the rate cycle in ways that equity and bond market volatility had not
- The Federal Reserve, facing the first banking crisis of its own tightening cycle, raises rates by 25 basis points in both February and March — reaching a target range of 4.75–5.00 percent — while simultaneously deploying emergency liquidity facilities to contain the banking sector stress; the two actions sit in direct tension with each other
- US inflation continues its descent: CPI at 6.4 percent in January, 6.0 in February, 5.0 in March — the fastest decline from peak in four decades, driven by the reversal of energy and goods prices, though services inflation remains stubborn above 7 percent
- The artificial intelligence revolution reaches a public inflection point in Q1 2023: Microsoft deploys GPT-4 across its products with a $10 billion investment in OpenAI, Google rushes its Bard assistant to market, and the technology conversation shifts from capability demonstration to economic disruption in the span of weeks
- Jamaica’s winter 2023 tourism season confirms the recovery’s durability: the Q1 arrival data shows the island sustaining near-2019 volumes for the second consecutive year, with hotel pricing holding despite the US consumer’s compressed balance sheet
- The Bank of Jamaica signals a shift toward the end of its tightening cycle as domestic inflation shows clear deceleration, though the policy rate remains at its highest level since the pre-reform period as the BOJ maintains its anti-inflationary stance through the quarter

It is March 10, 2023. Silicon Valley Bank is being closed by the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, the second-largest bank failure in US history, because rising interest rates turned the Treasury bonds it bought in 2020 and 2021 into unrealised losses that became realised losses the moment it needed to sell them. A bank built on the deposits of the technology industry’s most sophisticated corporate clients failed because it forgot that rates go up as well as down, and because the same clients who understood that lesson faster than anyone else withdrew their money simultaneously on Thursday when the news broke. Forty-eight hours later, Signature Bank is gone too. A week after that, a 167-year-old Swiss institution is being absorbed by its rival in a deal structured over a weekend by the Swiss government. In Kingston, the Bank of Jamaica is raising interest rates by 25 basis points and hoping the banking stress arriving from the rate cycle it has been tracking since August 2021 does not produce in Jamaica the kind of second-order effects it is producing in California and Geneva. And somewhere between those financial system fires, a company called OpenAI has released GPT-4, and the conversation about what the next decade’s economy looks like has just changed entirely.
SVB, Signature, Credit Suisse: The Rate Cycle’s First Victims
The failure of Silicon Valley Bank on March 10, 2023 was a specific product of a specific set of decisions made in a specific interest rate environment — and then revealed when that environment reversed with the speed that 2022’s tightening cycle had delivered. SVB had accumulated a large portfolio of long-duration US Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities during the 2020–2021 period of near-zero rates, when deposit inflows from its technology sector clients were large and lending demand was insufficient to absorb them. Those securities were purchased at prices that reflected 2021’s rate environment; their mark-to-market value in 2023 reflected 4.75–5.00 percent rates instead. So long as SVB did not need to sell them — so long as the unrealised losses remained unrealised — the bank could report capital adequacy on a held-to-maturity basis that concealed the gap. What the bank needed to not happen was a simultaneous withdrawal by its concentrated client base. That is what happened.
The venture capital community — SVB’s core depositor base — shared information through networks that, in a stress scenario, became a coordination mechanism. When SVB announced on March 8 that it had sold securities at a loss and was raising capital, the information moved through those networks at the speed of Slack messages and WhatsApp groups. By Thursday March 9, $42 billion in deposits had been withdrawn or requested. The bank could not meet those outflows and California regulators closed it on Friday morning. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s standard deposit insurance covers balances up to $250,000; the overwhelming majority of SVB’s deposits were held by corporate clients with balances well above that threshold, making the uninsured deposit question the immediate policy problem. The Treasury, the Fed and the FDIC announced on Sunday March 12 that all depositors at SVB and Signature Bank — which regulators had also closed over the weekend — would be made whole, a decision that removed the immediate systemic risk while raising the longer-term question of what insurance coverage institutions could expect going forward.
The European dimension of the banking stress arrived with Credit Suisse’s emergency weekend acquisition by UBS on March 19. Credit Suisse had been managing a series of risk management failures, client outflows and reputational crises across multiple years; the SVB-driven flight to quality in financial sector assets accelerated a bank run that Swiss regulators concluded the institution could not survive. The Swiss National Bank provided CHF 100 billion in liquidity support; the Swiss government provided CHF 9 billion in loss guarantees to UBS; and holders of approximately CHF 17 billion in Credit Suisse Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds were written to zero — ahead of equity holders, in a reversal of the normal creditor hierarchy that sent a shock through the AT1 market globally. For Jamaica, the banking stress’s direct effects were limited: no Jamaican financial institution had material exposure to SVB, Signature or Credit Suisse. The indirect effects — through tighter global financial conditions, risk appetite compression and the question of whether the rate cycle had broken something that would require a pivot — were the channels through which Q1’s banking turmoil mattered to the island’s economic planning.
The Fed’s Dilemma: Inflation Meets Financial Stability
The Federal Reserve’s March 22 decision to raise rates by 25 basis points — despite the banking stress that had erupted twelve days earlier — was one of the most closely watched FOMC decisions in the modern era. The Committee was simultaneously deploying the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP), a new emergency lending facility that allowed banks to borrow against the face value of their Treasury and agency securities (rather than their market value), specifically to address the unrealised loss problem that had sunk SVB. That facility was expansionary — it injected liquidity and effectively reduced the value of the rate hike’s transmission to bank balance sheets. The rate hike itself was contractionary. The two actions, deployed simultaneously, sat in logical tension that Chair Powell addressed by describing them as aimed at different objectives: the rate hike at inflation, the BTFP at financial stability. The market’s assessment was that the two objectives were in tension in a way that would eventually require the Fed to choose between them.
US CPI’s continued decline through Q1 provided the context within which the Fed’s “we can do both” argument was most plausible. The January reading of 6.4 percent was still elevated but trending in the right direction; the March reading of 5.0 percent — a full percentage point below January — was the fastest quarterly CPI decline from peak in the cycle. The energy component’s continued retreat and the goods inflation reversal that supply chain normalisation had produced were driving the headline lower at a pace that, if sustained, would put the Fed’s 2 percent target in sight within 2023 or 2024. Core services inflation, however — primarily shelter and services excluding energy — remained above 7 percent and was moving slowly. The “last mile” problem that the Annual 2022 review had identified as the defining monetary policy challenge for 2023 was exactly what the data was confirming: the easy part of the inflation decline, driven by commodity prices and goods, was largely complete; the hard part, driven by wages and shelter, was not.
The AI Inflection: GPT-4 and What It Changes
The public release of GPT-4 by OpenAI on March 14, 2023 marked the moment when the artificial intelligence conversation moved from academic curiosity to economic inevitability in the mainstream business press. Microsoft’s $10 billion investment in OpenAI, announced in January, had already positioned the technology as a serious commercial product; GPT-4’s demonstrable capability improvements over its predecessor — in reasoning, in language, in the ability to pass standardised professional examinations at high percentile scores — made the argument that this was a general-purpose technology with broad economic effects across a range of industries and occupations. Google’s accelerated launch of its Bard assistant in February, driven by the competitive threat that ChatGPT posed to the core search business, confirmed that the technology’s largest established players saw the shift as existential to existing business models.
For Jamaica’s economic planning horizon, the AI inflection of Q1 2023 raised questions that were too early to quantify but too significant to ignore. Tourism — the island’s dominant economic sector — is a labour-intensive service industry whose core value proposition is human-delivered hospitality: personal attention, local knowledge, cultural authenticity that cannot be replicated by software. That core product’s competitive position is unlikely to be directly disrupted by large language models in the near term. The back-office and administrative functions that support the tourism sector — marketing, customer service, booking management, financial reporting — are more susceptible to AI-driven productivity change, with implications for the labour market that support those functions. For the wider Jamaican economy, the questions were more pointed: remittance-sending diaspora Jamaicans in the United States and United Kingdom occupy employment categories — professional services, administrative roles, healthcare support — that the early AI disruption literature had identified as moderately to highly susceptible to automation. A technology cycle that permanently altered the labour market in the primary remittance-sending jurisdictions would have structural implications for Jamaica’s remittance inflows that no prior macroeconomic scenario had modelled.
Winter 2023: The Recovery’s Second Year
The tourism data for Q1 2023 answered the question that the Annual 2022 review had left open: whether the completed recovery would prove durable in its second year, or whether the pent-up demand that had driven 2022’s performance would fade into a normalisation that looked like decline against the prior year’s exceptional baseline. The answer, confirmed through Q1’s arrival and revenue data, was durability. Stopover arrivals in the January–March period tracked closely to 2022’s strong comparable, and hotel revenue per available room in the major resort corridors showed continued strength. The Jamaica Tourist Board‘s advance booking data for Q2 and Q3 pointed toward a full-year 2023 total that would confirm the tourism recovery as a stable new baseline rather than a one-year rebound.
The durability finding was significant because Q1 2023’s US consumer — the one buying the Jamaica holidays — was not in a materially better financial position than Q1 2022’s. US real wages were recovering as inflation fell faster than nominal wages grew, which was the first time in two years that the labour income recovery was outrunning the price level. But the US housing market remained effectively frozen by 7 percent mortgage rates, the stock market had recovered from its 2022 bear market lows but remained well below November 2021’s peak, and the banking stress had added a new uncertainty about the economic outlook that surveys were reflecting in consumer confidence measures. The Jamaica holiday purchase was being made by a consumer who had reason to be cautious. The fact that they were making it anyway — at prices above 2019 levels, in volumes close to 2022’s — was the empirical confirmation that Jamaica’s tourism product had achieved something the recovery’s architects had hoped for but could not guarantee: it had become a committed expenditure in the American consumer’s annual budget rather than a marginal one subject to discretionary reduction in stress.
The Bank of Jamaica‘s Q1 posture reflected the BOJ’s reading of an environment in which the inflation trajectory was clearly improving but the job was not complete. The policy rate held near its cycle high as the BOJ maintained the restrictive stance that its framework required until domestic inflation had durably returned toward the 4–6 percent target range. The BOJ’s communications through Q1 introduced a more forward-looking tone about the eventual easing cycle — acknowledging that the end of tightening was in view without committing to a specific timeline — that the mortgage market was parsing carefully for signals about when the borrowing cost environment would begin to relax.
What This Means
Homeowners enter Q2 2023 in a property market where the rate cycle’s end is visible on the horizon for the first time since the tightening began in August 2021. The BOJ’s signal that the cycle is approaching its terminal point does not mean immediate rate cuts — the path from “end of tightening” to “beginning of easing” can be measured in quarters, not weeks — but it marks the shift from a market defined by rising financing costs to one defined by anticipation of their eventual stabilisation. For existing homeowners, the rate environment’s stability around current levels is a steady state rather than a continuing headwind; for prospective buyers, the message is that waiting for lower rates may mean waiting longer than the near-term data would suggest, but that the direction of travel is finally clear. The supply constraint remains the structural feature that most directly determines property values in Jamaica’s major markets, and that constraint has not materially eased through the rate cycle’s duration.
Renters in Jamaica’s tourism parishes enter Q2 2023 with the most encouraging economic position since the pandemic began. The winter season’s sustained employment — the direct result of arrivals holding near-2019 levels for the second consecutive year — has produced a labour market in the hospitality sector that is, in key resort parishes, the tightest in recent memory. Employers who need experienced hotel workers, restaurant staff and tourism-adjacent service providers are competing for a workforce that has options. Wage pressure from that competition is beginning to produce real wage gains — nominal wage increases that are outrunning the now-declining inflation rate for the first time in three years. For the renter who works in the tourism sector and has been waiting for the economic recovery to translate into real purchasing power improvement, Q1 2023 is the quarter where that translation finally begins to happen.
Developers reading Q1 2023 are processing the most positive combination of demand signals and improving cost conditions the development thesis has seen since before the tightening cycle began. The demand case is confirmed by two consecutive years of near-2019 tourism volumes, which have produced sustained hospitality employment, which has sustained the buyer class whose income qualifies them for residential mortgages. Construction material costs — which peaked with the supply chain crisis and have been moderating since — are continuing their decline. The rate environment, while still elevated, is closer to its peak than its trajectory was a year ago. The project that underwrites at current rates and delivers in 2025 faces a financing cost profile that is likely to have improved by delivery, rather than worsened. That is a materially different planning assumption than developers were operating with in 2022.
Businesses across Jamaica enter Q2 2023 having confirmed in Q1 that the tourism revenue base is sustaining. The winter season’s durability — arrivals holding, pricing holding, hotel occupancy rates running near 2022’s exceptional levels — means that the cost rationalisation work that businesses did in 2022 to survive the commodity shock while maintaining revenue is now producing operating leverage in the direction of margin recovery. Energy costs have moderated from their 2022 peaks as petroleum prices have declined from their Russia-Ukraine shock highs. Food import costs, while still elevated, have stopped rising at the pace that compressed Q2 and Q3 2022 margins. The businesses entering Q2 2023 in the strongest position are those that completed their cost restructuring in 2022 and are now capturing the operating leverage that comes from a stable revenue base against a moderating cost structure.
Diaspora Jamaicans in the United States enter Q2 2023 with a financial position that is incrementally improving after the difficulties of 2022. US real wage growth has turned positive as inflation decelerates faster than nominal wage growth — a reversal of the 2021–2022 dynamic that had been eroding real purchasing power for two years. The US labour market remains strong; unemployment is near fifty-year lows and the banking stress of Q1, while concerning, has not yet translated into the wave of tech sector layoffs that SVB’s failure might have been expected to presage. The equity market’s partial recovery from the 2022 bear market has restored some of the household wealth lost in the tightening cycle’s first year. Remittance flows to Jamaica through Q1 have remained consistent with the elevated post-pandemic baseline. The AI disruption question — whether the technology shifts arriving in Q1 will, over a longer horizon, alter the employment landscape for diaspora Jamaicans in white-collar and administrative roles — is too early to assess but too significant to dismiss.
Outlook
Q2 2023 will be defined by whether the banking stress of Q1 produces second-order effects in the US economy — tighter credit conditions, reduced small business lending, a cooling labour market — that alter the trajectory of both the Fed’s rate path and the US consumer’s travel spending capacity. The immediate crisis was contained by the FDIC deposit guarantee and the BTFP’s liquidity provision; whether those interventions were sufficient to prevent a broader credit tightening that amplifies the rate cycle’s slowdown effect is the question the economic data through Q2 will answer. A credit crunch that materialises alongside the Fed’s still-elevated rates could produce the US recession that the 2022 yield curve inversion had been warning about, arriving later than the inversion’s usual predictive window but through the banking channel rather than the rate channel.
Jamaica’s Q2 2023 outlook is constructive in the ways that matter most for the recovery’s sustainability: tourism demand is confirmed, the inflation trajectory is improving, the BOJ is approaching the end of its tightening cycle, and the cost pressures that compressed 2022’s business margins are moderating. The risks are external and asymmetric — a US credit event or recession would affect Jamaica through the tourism and remittance channels that the recovery depends on — and the probability distribution of those risks shifted in March in ways that the data through Q2 will clarify. The structural foundations are intact. The external tail risk has become somewhat more salient. That is the essential characterisation of where Jamaica stands as Q1 2023 closes.
Jamaica Economic Intelligence is an independent data-driven journalism series tracking Jamaica’s economic performance across the housing, tourism, fiscal and monetary sectors. Historical data drawn from Bank of Jamaica, Statistical Institute of Jamaica, International Monetary Fund and Jamaica Tourist Board publications. This report covers Q1 2023: January–March 2023.

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